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Comments
BARGAINING UNITS FOR STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
No question so crucial to state and local government labor relations has
been as neglected as that of bargaining unit determination. Recently, however, the question has received increasing attention.' With the growing
number, organization, and militancy of state and local government employees, the types as well as numbers of disputes over bargaining units will
multiply. This comment explores the nature and significance of the issues
in these disputes. First, however, some background on state and local public
sector labor law, with particular attention to Missouri,2 is necessary.
State and local government employers enjoy virtual freedom from
federal regulation. The National Labor Relations Act 3 specifically excludes
states and their political subdivisions from its definition of "employer" 4 The
wage and hour requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 5 are, however,
applicable to state and local school, hospital, health institution, and transit

1. E.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ]NTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT
ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Sept.

1969, 78-74 (1970) [hereinafter ACIR]; Anderson, Selection and Certification of
Representatives in Public Employment, PROcEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVErrrY's
20th ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 277, 279-88 (1968); Friedman, Unit
Determination by Mini-PERBs, PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YoHm UNrVERSITyS 21st
ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 499 (1969); Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 28 HASTINGs L.J.
719, 788-43 (1972); Klein, Unit Determination in New York State Under the
Public Employees' Fair Employment Law, P.OCEEDINGs OF NEw YonK UNIVERsrr's 21ST ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 487 (1969); Rock, The Appropriate
Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 1001 (1969); Shaw &Clark, Determinationof Appropriate Bargaining Units
in the Public Sector: Legal and PracticalProblems, 51 ORE. L. REV. 151 (1971);
Slavney, The Public Employee-How Shall He Be Represented in Collective
Negotiations?,269 GoVT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REP. E-1 (1968); Smythe, Recognition-Unit Determination-NegotiableIssues, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR'S CONFERENCE ON STATE AND LOCAL GovmERiNT LABOR RELATIONS,

Nov. 21-28, 1971, 50-51 (1972); Sullivan, Appropriate Unit Determinations in
Public Employee Collective Bargaining,19 MERCER L. REv. 402 (1968); Werne,
Collective Bargainingin the Public Sector, 22 VA-D. L. REv. 838, 844-52 (1969);
Comment, Determination of the Bargaining Unit Under the New Pennsylvania
Public Employee RelationsAct, 75 DICK. L. REv. 490 (1971).
2. For a more comprehensive discussion see Loevi, The Development and

Current Application of Missouri Public Sector Labor Law, 86 Mo. L. REv. 167
(1971).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
4. Id. § 152(2). This section excludes the federal government, also, but

federal employee labor relations is extensively regulated under Exec. Order No.

11,491, 8 C.F.R. 262 (1978), 5 U.S.C. § 7801 (1970), as amended, Exec. Order
No. 11,616, 86 Fed. Reg. 17819 (1971); Exec. Order No. 11,686, 86 Fed. Reg.
24901 (1971).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
(187)
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employees. 6 There is some federal constitutional protection of the right of
state and local employees to organize, but the extent of this protection
7
is uncertain.
Until recently, state and local employee organization and negotiation
has existed, if at all, in a legal vacuum. The last decade, however, has witnessed a rash of state legislation, and presently 44 states and the District of
Columbia have laws recognizing, expressly or impliedly, the right of at least
some public employees to engage in some type of union activity.8 Some of
these laws merely give minimal rights to narrow groups; 9 others are extremely comprehensive.' 0 Six states have no public labor relations act."
B. Missouri Law
Dominating every aspect of Missouri public sector labor law is the
landmark case of City of Springfield v. Clouse.' 2 There the Missouri Supreme
Court, in dictum, acknowledged the constitutional right of public employees
to organize and petition their respective employers,' 3 subject to certain
limitations "for the public welfare."' 4 The court held, however, that the
state constitutional guarantee of the right to bargain collectively' 5 was
limited to private employees,' 6 and that public employers could not engage
in "collective bargaining" in the strict sense of the term because that would
amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers.' 7 Clouse

6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 208(d), (s) (4) (1970).
7. See text accompanying notes 67-83 infra.

8. For a collection of most of these statutes see 1, 2 STATE LAWs CCH
LA. L. REP. 47,000-47,550 (1978); BEF. FILmE GOV'T EMTLOYEE RELATIONS
REP. 51:1011-51:6023 (1973). The various state laws differ greatly on fundamental aspects like the employer's duty to negotiate, the employees covered,
whether the employer is bound by the negotiations, the standards and procedures
for determining bargaining units and majority representation, the definition
and prevention of unfair labor practices, and the procedures for mediation or
arbitration.
9. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 87, § 450(3) (2) (Supp. 1971) (acknowledging
limited right of firemen to organize); IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4536 (1970)
(acknowledging teachers' right to organize).
10. E.g., HAwA REv. STAT. §§ 89-1 to 89-20 (Supp. 1973).
11. Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia.
12. 856 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 589 (En Banc 1947).
13. Id. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 542, based on U.S. CONST. amend. I; Mo.
CoNsT. art. 1, §§ 8,9 (1945) (freedom of speech and assembly).
14. "[A] public officer or employee, as a condition of the terms of his public
service, voluntarily gives up such part of his rights as may be essential to the
public welfare . . . ." City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1247, 206
S.W.2d 539, 542 (En Banc 1947).
15. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 29 provides: "[E]mployees shall have the right
to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing."
16. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1247, 206 S.W.2d 539,
542 (En Banc 1947).
17. Id. at 1250-51; 206 S.W.2d at 545. The court reasoned that all aspects
of public employment are legislative matters that cannot be delegated to the
public employer or bargained away.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/4
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appears to be good law on that point in Missouri today.18 The only possible
exception to the rule prohibiting public sector collective bargaining in Missouri is where the public employer engages in a proprietary function separate from its governmental operations. 19
The court in Clouse also pointed out that the city of Springfield must
deal with all its employees on the same basis under its civil service system.
Thus, any 2action
beyond that authorized by the civil service law would be
0
ultra vires.
18. See State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 85, 41 (Mo.
1969).
19. In City of Springfield v. Clouse, 856 Mo. 1289, 1252, 206 S.W.2d
539, 546 (En Bane 1947), the court observed:
We do not say that the General Assembly could not separate corporate
functions, and employees engaged therein, and provide for their operatlion and management in some manner distinctly apart from other city
functions (perhaps like the Tennessee Valley Authority under the federal
government) so that employer and employee relations could be handled
on a basis similar to private industry. However, it is clear that this has
not been done in our cities of the second class.
Later, in State ex rel. Moore v. Julian, 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720 (En Banc
1949), the court held that § 91.330, RSMo 1969, which grants second class cities
the power to separate the operation and management of city-owned public utilities
from other city functions under a board of public utilities, had, in the case of the
Springfield bus system operating under the Springfield Board of Public Utilities,
rendered the operation of the bus system a proprietary, rather than governmental,
function. Thus, the bus system was subject to the provisions of the King-Thompson
Act, § 295.010, RSMo 1969 (see note 31 infra), which provides for the State
Board of Mediation to intervene in the settlement of labor disputes involving
public utilities. The union and the bus system had written labor agreements for
the years 1946, 1947. The city denied that these were binding contracts. The
union gave timely notice of its desire to change certain provisions, and, when the
city demurred, sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the State Board of Mediation
to compel the city to renegotiate the agreements. The city argued unsuccessfully
that public employers like the bus system were not subject to the King-Thompson
Act because public employment is not a matter for collective bargaining under
Clouse.
Ten years later, in Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. En Banc
1958), the court held that'under Springfield's city charter, adopted subsequent
to Julian, the matter of the wages, working conditions, tenure, etc., of the employees of the city utilities was not part of a proprietary function of the city, and
thus the State Board of Mediation had no jurisdiction to mediate labor disputes
involving the utilities. The court did not, however, retreat from the proprietarygovernmental distinction drawn in Clouse and Julian.
20. 356 Mo. at 1252-58, 206 S.W.2d at 546-47. Although this dictum may
be overstated, there is no doubt that civil service and merit systems limit the
scope of public employee labor relations. See J. LELCHOO & J. LAEWN, COLLECTIvE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND THE MERIT SYSTEM (1972). The
Attorney General of Missouri has held, for example, that the Division of Mental
Health may not agree to make promotions or transfers based on seniority because
the law requires that they be made on the basis of merit and fitness to be ascertained by competitive examinations. 28 Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri
No. 357, July 22, 1971.
The broader implication of the Clouse dictum is that no government employer
may negotiate with, reach an agreement with, or legislate regarding any labor
union in the absence of express statutory or constitutional authority. See 14
Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri No. 68, March 15, 1957, holding, inter
alia, that county courts may not enter employment contracts with labor unions
because there is no express authority for them to do so. This argument should now
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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In 1965 Missouri enacted its first public employee labor relations act. 21
The act gave all public employees, except employees falling generally into
the categories of policemen and teachers, the right to organize and to petition their employers regarding salaries and other conditions of employment.22 It further authorized any public body to negotiate with labor
organizations, 23 and it provided that the results of any negotiations be
24
reduced to writing and presented to the public body for appropriate action.
The employer's authority to negotiate was discretionary rather than manda26
tory,2 51 and the results of the negotiations were not binding on2 the employer.
Y
Clouse.
It has been suggested that the act merely codified
This act was superseded in 1967 by the current public employee relations
act, 28 which made two significant changes. First, it requires the public body
to "meet and confer" 20 with labor representatives regarding salaries and
other conditions of employment. This requirement is not an unconstitutional
delegation under Clouse because the governing body is not bound by the
results of the negotiations.30 Second, it gives the Missouri State Board of
Mediation thereinafter the Board] jurisdiction to resolve issues respecting
bargaining units and majority representation. 3'
be obsolete. See text accompanying notes 21-27 and note 27 infra; but see note
81 infra.
21. Mo. Laws 1965, at 232, §§ 1-4 (repealed, Mo. Laws 1967, at 192-94,
§ 1, enacting in lieu thereof §§ 105.500-.530, RSMo 1969).
22. Mo. Laws 1965, at 282, § 2. Certain public employers like the Missouri
Conservation Commission (Mo. CoNsr. art. IV, §§ 40(a), 42) and the University
of Missouri (MO. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a)), whose authority over management is
constitutional, may not be covered by the act. A circuit court has held to the
contrary regarding the University of Missouri. Curators of U. of Mo. v. Public
Serv. Employees Local 45, No. 54787 (Cir. Ct. Boone County, filed Nov. 6,
1972), appeal docketed, No. 58646, Missouri Supreme Court, April 15, 1974.
The act may not apply to constitutional charter cities. "No law shall be
enacted creating or fixing the powers, duties, or compensation of any municipal
office or employment, for any city framing or adopting its own charter under this
or any previous constitution ... ." MO. CoNsr. art. VI, § 22. See State ex rel.
Burke v. Cervantes, 423 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1968); 35 Mo. L. REv. 86 (1970).
23. Mo. Laws 1965, at 282, § 3.
24. Id.
25. 23 Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri No. 68, May 6, 1966.
26. Id.
27. Nickolaus, Public Employee-Employer Relations: A Discusison of S.B.
I12, 80 Mo. MuN. Rnv. 262, 266 (1965). The act seemingly eliminated any
argument that it was ultra vires for some public employers to deal with unions at
all because it covered all public bodies. See note 20 supra; but see note 81 infra.
28. §§ 105.500-.530, RSMo 1969.
29. § 105.520, RSMo 1969.
80. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969); 24
Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri No. 373, Oct. 17, 1967.
81. § 105.525, RSMo 1969. The five-man Board was established in 1947 by §
295.080, RSMo 1969, which is a part of the King-Thompson Act, §§ 295.010.210, RSMo 1969, to regulate pubic utility labor disputes. Provisions of this act
allowing seizure and operation of public utilities by the state to prevent strikes
were invalidated under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution because
they conflicted with § 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees private employees the
right to strike, in Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 874 U.S. 74 (1963). The remainder of
the act, regarding the existence of the Board, its power and its jurisdiction to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/4
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The Missouri statute 32 has been construed as codifying the common law
prohibition 33 against public employees striking.3 4 The prohibition covers
threats to strike and work slowdowns as well.35 Though an injunction lies
against such strikes, threats to strike, and slowdowns, 36 the deterrent effect
37
of that potential remedy is debatable.
Having outlined Missouri public sector labor law, this comment will
next examine one participant in the bargaining unit determination process,
the Missouri State Board of Mediation, and then turn to the issues involved
in such determinations.
II. Trm BoARm
The Missouri public employee relations act38 provides:

Issues with respect to appropriateness of bargaining units and
majority representative status shall be resolved by the state board

of mediation. In the event that the appropriate administrative body

or any of the bargaining units shall be aggrieved by the decision of
the state board of mediation, an appeal may be had to the circuit

court of the county where the administrative body is located or in
the circuit court of Cole County. The state board of mediation shall
use the services of the state hearing officer in all contested cases.39
The Board's procedures are governed by the Missouri Administrative
Procedure Act.4 0 The Board has chosen to conduct its hearings informally,
and has not adopted rules of procedure. 41 This has led to criticism of Board
proceedings as "lacking in fundamental fairness and . . . arbitrary and

mediate public utility labor disputes, is severable and remains in force. State
ex rel. State Bd. of Mediation v. Pigg, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75 (En Banc
1951) (declining to consider constitutionality of seizure provisions in action by
the Board against the state comptroller for payment of salaries and expenses).
82. "Nothing contained in sections 105.500 to 105.530 shall be construed as
granting a right to employees covered in sections 105.500 to 105.530 to strike."
§ 105.530, RSMo 1969.
83. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1147, 1156 (1971).
34. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo. 1969)
(dictum); City of Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
85. City of Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
36. Id.
37. From 1966 through 1971 there were at least 43 strikes by state and
local government employees in Missouri, causing over 35,000 man-days idle.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS IN THE MIDWEST REGION 48 (1973).

38. § 105.500, RSMo 1969.
39. Id. § 105.525.
40. § 536.010, RSMo 1969; City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
41. Mo. CONST. art IV, § 16, and § 536.020, RSMo 1969, require all rules
and regulations of administrative agencies to be filed with the secretary of state,
but do not require that such ever be adopted in the first place. City of Kirkwood
v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 699 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
Section 295.070(1), RSMo 1969, provides that "[the board shall by regulation
prescribe the methods of procedure before it." This statute was apparently not
argued in Kirkwood. Because it is part of the King-Thompson Act (§ 295.010,
RSMo 1969), which deals with public utilities only (see note 31 supra), it may
not be applicable to Board functioning vis 'a vis public employers generally.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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capricious," 42 and Board findings of fact have been alleged to be too general
44
and vague.43 In City of Kirkwood v. Missouri State Board of Mediation,
however, the Missouri Court of Appeals sanctioned the Board's informal
hearings and procedure,45 rejected contentions of arbitrariness, 46 and found
47
Board findings of fact and conclusions of law to be sufficient.
The Board's policy is to encourage the parties, typically the union and
the city, to agree on the appropriate bargaining unit or majority representative status.4 8 Most disputes are in fact settled, often with the participation
of the Board, without a hearing. 49 This Board policy has been cited as an
abuse of discretion,"0 but has been held to be proper.51 In City of Kirkwood
2
v. Missouri State Board of MediationO
the court held that, because section
105.5255 does not state the criteria the Board is to follow in its determinations, the General Assembly left this to the Board's discretion.54
42. City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 69798 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 66 CCH
LAu. GAs. %I52,669, at 68,478 & n.7, 424 Gov'T EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT
B-6 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Texas County 1971).
43. City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 69394 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972). A frequent uncertainty in Board proceedings is the
statutory requirement in § 105.525 (see statute quoted at note 39 supra) that the
Board utilize the services of the state hearing officer. It has been asserted that
the lack of a hearing officer at a hearing deprives the Board of jurisdiction. City
of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 695-97 (1972).
The court in Kirkwood found that no such officer existed, and read the requirement out of the statute. 478 S.W.2d at 697. But af. State ex rel. Missey v. City
of Cabool, 66 CCH LAB. CAs. 52,669, at 68,478, 424 Govr. EMPLOYEE RELATIoNs REPORT B-6 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Texas County 1971).
44. 478 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
45. Id. at 697-98.
46. Id.
47. The court stated that if the city wanted more specific findings it should
have requested them. Id. at 699. Section 536.090, RSMo 1969, requires findings
and conclusions to be stated separately.
48. E.g., IBEW Local 2 v. City of Kirkwood 3,4 (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Sept 19, 1970) [hereinafter Kirkwood Hearing]; In re Employees at City
of Sikeston 34-35 (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Jan. 25, 1968) [hereinafter
Sikeston Hearing]. The court of appeals in City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd.
of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972), found that this policy
was not necessarily improper. Id. at 697-98.
49. From 1967 through 1972, the Board acted officially on only 27 of at
least 69 requests for determinations of appropriate units and majority representation, and in all but 8 of those 27 the parties stipulated the appropriate unit and
the Board simply supervised the representation election.
50. City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690,
697-98 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See statute quoted at note 39 supra.
54. 478 S.W.2d at 695. The Board has engaged in fact-finding concerning
wages and other conditions of employment in the absence of statutory authority;
it did so at the request of the parties, however, so jurisdiction was not questioned.
In re Employees at the Div. of Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo. State Bd. of
Mediation, Dec. 14, 1970, & June 10, 1971). If there are no bargaining unit or
election issues, the Board is technically without jurisdiction, but it has often offered
to officially ratify stipulations by the parties as to majority representation in
stipulated units, e.g., Kirkwood Hearing, supra note 48, Respondents Exhibit B.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/4
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The court in Kirkwood assumed that the Missouri Administrative

Procedure Act governed review of Board orders. 55 Section 105.525, however,
can be interpreted as providing specific statutory review.5 6 In either case
Board determinations 57 are reviewed under the "competent and substantial
evidence upon the whole record" test.58
III. CHOOSING THE APPROPlTATE BARGAINING UNIT

A. Nature and Importance of the Bargaining Unit 9
A bargaining unit is a specified group of employees that is represented
as a unit by a labor organization in labor negotiations and in the administration of agreements arrived at in negotiation. A majority of the unit members
determine what, if any, labor organization will be the unit's "exclusive
If the Board is asked to determine majority representation in a stipulated unit
which includes employees excluded from the act by § 105.510 (see statute quoted
at note 66 infra), the Board should arguably reject such a stipulated unit. See
Camden Cty. &Local 1965, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees [hereinafter AFSCME], 885 Covr EMLOE. RLM ATONS REP. B-8
(N.J. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n 1969) (rejecting smaller units stipulated among employer and unions in favor of employer-wide unit on ground that
stipulated units might not give full deference to employees' community of interest).
Section 295.080, RSMo 1969, directs the Board to take whatever steps it
deems expedient to bring about a settlement of a dispute, including assisting in
negotiating and drafting a settlement agreement. This section is part of the KingThompson Act and relates to the Board's function vis a vis public utilities and is
not directly concerned with public employers generally (see note 81 supra). It
fairly implies, however, a legislative intent to give the Board considerable discretion in its manner of operation.
55. 478 S.W.2d at 693. The review provision is § 586.140, RSMo 1969. If
the provisions for review in the APA are applicable, it may be possible to have
the case removed to a circuit court when there is unreasonable delay by the
Board. §§ 586.100-.110, RSMo 1969. The contrary argument is that the Board
has primary jurisdiction and mandamus is the appropriate remedy. Cf. State ex rel.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Padberg, 846 Mo. 1188, 1186-87, 145 S.W.2d 150, 151 (En
Banc 1940); accord, Universal Org. of Munic. Foremen, Superv. and Admin. Pers.
v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 42 Wis. 2d 815, 166 N.W.2d 289 (1969).
56. See statute quoted at note 89 supra. Section 105.525 gives the "administrative body" and any of the bargaining units a right to appeal. If "administrative body" means the employer, it is inconsistent with the universal use of the
term "public body" to describe the public employer in other sections of the act.
57. Mandamus has been used to force the Board to act. State ex rel. Missey
v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, No. 58552 (Mo. S. Ct., Jan. 11, 1968). A declaratory judgment of the Board's powers may be obtained. §§ 527.010-.020, RSMo
1969.
58. City of Kirkwood v. Mo. State Board of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690, 698
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
59. See Bakke, Reflections on the Future of Bargainingin the Public Sector,
98 MONThLY LABOR R v. 21, 24 (July 1970); Rock, supra note 1.
Unit issues typically arise either between the public employer and the union,
or between or among competing unions. For example, a city may prefer a citywide unit in which no union could obtain majority representation or with which,
if majority representation were obtained, it would be easier to negotiate. A union
may prefer a smaller, more homogeneous unit in which it would be certain of
solid support. If there are competing unions, one may have overwhelming support
within a specific group of a city's employees with little or no support outside that
group, while another may be able to obtain majority representation on a city-wide
basis without any support from the smaller group.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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bargaining representative." 60 Exclusive representation means that no other
organization may represent members of that unit.8 1 Until there have been
valid determinations of an appropriate unit and majority representation, the
62
employer has no duty to "meet and confer."
Unit disputes are resolved in a number of ways. The parties themselves
may agree formally on the appropriate unit or units. Care should be taken
in drafting the agreement to describe explicitly and comprehensively, not
only those employees included, but also those excluded, by department,
division, job classification, job description, or other sufficient identification.6
The parties may, if they wish, send a copy of such an agreement to the
64
Board, and it will make a finding of the appropriate unit as stipulated.
If the parties are unable to agree, one of them may request that the Board
resolve the unit issues. A final alternative is an informal arrangement in
which there is no meaningful resolution of potential unit issues. The union
alleges that it represents a group of employees, and the employer replies
that the door is always open for discussion of employee grievances. This kind
of arrangement leaves uncertain whether certain employees are included
and whether there actually is majority support for the union. 65
Two basic issues arise respecting the appropriateness of a bargaining
unit. The first deals with the necessary exclusion of certain employees from
the unit, and the second relates to the appropriate size of the unit. This
comment approaches these issues primarily from the perspective of contested cases; the extent to which parties may validly stipulate otherwise is
another question.
B. Employees Excluded From the Unit
1. Statutory Exclusions
Section 105.510 provides, in part, as follows:
Employees, except police, deputy sheriffs, Missouri state highway
60. § 105.500(2), RSMo 1969.
61. This does not prevent dissenting individual members of the unit from
bypassing negotiations and expressing their views directly to the employer. State
ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 48 (Mo. 1969). The validity
of a union shop agreement, which requires all members of the unit to join the
union, in the Missouri public sector is uncertain. The act does not expressly
prohibit a union shop, but such a prohibition conceivably could be inferred from
the following portion of § 105.510, RSMo 1969:
No such employee shall be discharged or discriminated against because
of his exercise of such right, nor shall any person or group of persons,
directly or indirectly, by intimidation or coercion, compel or attempt to
compel any such employee to join or refrain from joining a labor
organization....
62. If the appropriate unit and majority representation have not been established, there can be no designated representatives of the employees. The employer can hardly be expected tQ "meet and confer" on an ad hoe basis with any
andall of its employees.
68. A. DRAcnAN, MuNiciPAL NEGOTIATIONS: FROM DTFEENCES TO
AGREEMENT 21 (1970).
64. See note 49 supra.
65. A public employer may be wise to concede in this manner since there
is no duty to negotiate until there have been valid determinations of the appropriate unit and majority representation.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/4
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patrolmen, Missouri national guard, all teachers of all Missouri
schools, colleges and universities, of any public body shall have
the right to form and join labor organizations and to present proposals to any public body relative to salaries and other conditions of
employment through the representative of their own choosing 6
Construed literally, the section seems to deny the excepted groups the right
to unionize. The traditional view was that the sovereign could prohibit its
employees from organizing, either on the theory that public employees
waived certain rights as a condition of employment, 6" or on grounds of public
policy.68 Recent federal cases have rejected this view, holding that the first
amendment protects the right of public employees to form and join labor
organizations. 69 The Supreme Court has never ruled0 on the question, but
there are indications it would follow these decisions."
The groups that are excluded from section 105.510 have a constitutional right to organize, but the character and extent of the permissible
organization is unclear. City of Springfield v. Clouse,71 in dictum, recognized
72
limitations on the constitutional right of public employees to organize,
73
citing the companion case of King v. Priest, which held that a city could
deny policemen the right to organize, reciting the waiver doctrine and pub-

66. § 105.510, RSMo 1969.
67. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1247, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542
(En Banc 1947). Put succinctly by Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
68. E.g., Perez v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of the City of Los Angeles, 78
Cal. App. 2d 688, 178 P.2d 537 (D. Ct. App. 1947); CIO v. City of Dallas, 198
S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E.
410 (1935); see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, 1154-55 (1953).
69. AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969) (street department
employees); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (teachers);
Me ton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (policemen); Atkins
v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (firemen). For more
detailed discussion of the constitutional right of public employees to organize see
Eisner, First Amendment Right of Association for Public Employee Union Members, 20 LAB. L.J. 438 (1969); Kilberg, Labor Relations in the Municipal Service,
7 HtARv. J. LEGIS. 1, 2-6 (1969); Leahy, From MeAuliffe to McLaughlin: A
Revolution in the Law of Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 57 ILL. B.J.
910 (1969); Note, Labor-ManagementRelations and Public Employees Engaged
in Protective Functions: Policemen and Firemen as Sui Generis, 5 GA. L. RIv.
540 (1971).
70. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 885 U.S. 589 (1967).
Even assuming a constitutional right to organize, some public employees,
particularly policemen, can likely be prohibited from affiliating with organizations
that represent other types of employees because such affiliation could cause conflicts of interest in the performance of their duties. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 728,
736-87 (1971). New Jersey, for example, prohibits membership by policemen in
unions that admit nonpolicemen. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1972).
71. 856 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (En Banc 1947).
72. Id. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
78. 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (En Banc 1947), appeal dismissed, 333
U.S. 852 (1948).
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lie policy as rationales. 74 Dictum in Bergmann v. Board of Education,75 however, can be read as acknowledging a right of teachers to unionize.76 But, in
State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool,77 the Missouri Supreme Court, in
dictum, cited American Federationof State, County, & MunicipalEmployees
v. Woodward,78 an Eighth Circuit case holding that public employees have
a constitutionally protected right to organize, but, also in dictum, stated that
the exclusion of policemen and teachers from the act is 79not an unreasonable
classification because they are sui generis, citing King.
Shortly after Missey the legislature repealed and reenacted section
105.510 in substantially the same form with the following addition: "[Except]
that the above excepted employees have the right to form benevolent, social,
or fraternal associations." 80 The only case since then is Peters v. Board of
Education.8 1 There the supreme court said that section 105.510 prohibited
teachers from being members of labor organizations, but held that they have
a constitutional right to "organize for any proper purpose ...and to present
their views and desires to any public officer or legislative body."8 2 The court
stated that this right is different from being a member of a labor organization. Because the agreement in controversy between the school board and
the teachers' organization provided for resolution of disagreements in an
advisory and nonbinding manner which the board was free to reject, the
agreement was not a labor contract and was not beyond the power of the
board to enter into. A federal court recently refused to rule on the constitutionality of section 105.510 for lack of a federal question because Missouri courts had never construed the section to prohibit organization.8
Whatever the resolution of this issue, there are questions of interpretation as to who falls within the excluded groups. The Board has excluded
74. Id. at 84-88, 206 S.W.2d at 555-57.
75. 860 Mo. 644,230 S.W.2d 714 (1950).
76. Id. at 654-55, 230 S.W.2d at 720-21.
77. 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
78. 406 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1969).
79. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 42-43 (Mo. 1969).
80. Mo. Laws 1969, at 186, § 1; § 105.510, RSMo 1969. The Attorney General of Missouri has said that a city can, by ordinance, exclude persons from the
coverage of a labor agreement because § 105.520 provides that the governing body
may adopt, modify, or reject the results of negotiations. Letter Opinion of Attorney
General of Missouri No. 84, Mar. 6, 1970.
81. 506 S.W.2d 429 (1974). The Attorney General of Missouri has held
that teachers have a right to organize and that § 105.510 merely excludes them
from the other provisions of the act. 25 Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri
No. 276, Dec. 12, 1968. This opinion was reaffirmed in 1970. 27 Opinion of
Attorney General of Missouri No. 57, June 1, 1970. The 1970 opinion also held
that school boards may not grant teachers a third level of negotiation and contained dictum that school boards cannot negotiate with teachers's unions at any
level, even though such negotiations would not be binding. The rationale for this
holding and dictum was that such negotiations would be ultra vires since § 105.510
excludes teachers from the act.
82. Peters v. Board of Edu., 506 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Mo. 1974), quoting
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1246, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (En
Bane 1947).
83. Fitzgerald v. di Grazia, 354 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mo. 1972). The court
suggested that the plaintiffs promptly seek a construction in Missouri courts.
Id. at 93.
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persons classified as "teachers" from a unit of employees at a state correctional facility on the grounds they were excluded from the act,8 but has
included persons classified as 'Teacher I," "Teacher II," "Education Assistant I," and "Education Assistant ir' in a unit of state mental health institution employees.8 5 The problem is not merely who is a "teacher," but also
what is a "school" within the section. The Attorney General of Missouri has
held that "Missouri national guard" means only guardsmen; thus, civilian
employees of the Guard are not excluded. The Attorney General also held
that guardsmen who work as civilian employees of the Guard may participate
in union activities related to their civilian employment."" There may be
questions whether such employees as meter maids, crossing guards, and
correction officers are "police;"8 7 there may even be questions of who is
an "employee." 8 Determining appropriate units under the act could become
extremely bewildering where large numbers of employees excluded by
section 105.510 are in the same department with nonexcluded employees.8 9
The Advisory.Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has taken the
position that exclusions such as contained in section 105.510 are counterproductive to effective public labor relations and has recommended that state
public employee labor relations acts deal uniformly with all state and local
occupational groups9 One author has observed that the inclusion of policemen, even in units with non-policemen, has not caused serious problems.9 1

84. In re Training School for Girls at Chillicothe (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, June 30, 1969). For support of the Board's decision see §§ 219.020, .320,
RSMo 1969; Letter Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri No. 292, Nov. 6,
1968.
85. In re Employees of the Div. of Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo.
State Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970).
86. 25 Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri No. 285, Dec. 10, 1968. The
opinion discussed neither the fact that the old section excluded "Missouri State
Highway Patrol" and "Missouri National Guard' (Mo. Laws 1965, at 232, § 2
(repealed Mo. Laws 1967, at 192-94, § 1, enacting in lieu thereof § 105.510,
RSMo 1969)), while the current section excludes "Missouri state highway
patrolmen" and "Missouri national guard," nor potential conflicts of interest for
guardsmen with dual employment status. (Emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., County of Gloucester v. Public Employees Rel. Comm'n,
107 N.J. Super. 150, 257 A.2d 712 (Super. Ct. 1969), affd, 55 N.J. 333, 262
A.2d 1 (1970).
88. Such a question may exist with respect to hospital interns, for example.
Compare Regents of the U. of Mich. v. Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n,
389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973), with In re Employees of Albert Einstein
Medical Center, 3 STATE L-ws CCH L.Ai. L. REP. 49,998.61 (Pa. Labor Relations Bd. 1971).
89. For example, a city could merge its police and fire departments into a
single department of public safety in which policemen and firemen maintained
their separate police and firefighting responsibilities but occupied the same
building and shared housekeeping and similar responsibilities under central
supervision. The chairman of the board has expressed doubts that the firemen
could be considered an appropriate unit under such circumstances. Interview
with Daniel C. Rogers, Chairman of the Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, in Columbia,
Mo., Feb. 17, 1973.
90. ACIR, supra note 1, at 94, 103-04.
91. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 416. It is questionable whether there is
sufficient data to rely on that observation.
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2. Other Exclusions
Managerial, confidential, security, and other employees are, in private
as well as public employment, excluded by case law, if not expressly by
statute, either because their inclusion could create conflicts of interest in the
performance of their duties or because they lack sufficient community of
interest with the employees included.92 The only statutory ground for
exclusion of such employees in Missouri is inability to establish "a clear and
identifiable community of interest."93
Employees directly involved in formulation of management policy or
exercising substantial discretion in its execution are excluded as managerial. 94
Elected and high-ranking appointed officials should obviously be excluded,
since they belong on the other side of the bargaining table. 95 The justification for exclusion of various levels of supervisory employees is frequently
debated, however. Supervisors in public employment, particularly lower level
supervisors, often lack the management identification manifested by their
counterparts in private employment, and they are frequently persons who
have been active in union affairs. 6 Some authorities have concluded that
supervisors can be included in units with employees they supervise without
serious harm, 7 although others strongly oppose such a unit9 " Some states
grant supervisors the right to organize and negotiate in units separate from
those of employees they supervise, but this can still lead to conflicts of
interest where the supervisors' organization is affiliated with the supervised
employees' organization. 9 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations has therefore recommended that supervisors be excluded entirely
from the rights conferred by state public labor relations acts. 100
But, who is a supervisor? Many statutes and decisions have followed
the National Labor Relations Act definition of "supervisor."' 01 Some state
92. Regarding managerial employees see 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970);
NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Co-op., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1968). Regarding confidential

employees see ACIR, supra note 1, at 95-96. See generally Shaw & Clark, supra

note 1, at 168.
98. § 105.500(1), RSMo 1969.
94. Cases cited note 92 supra.

95. Sullivan, supranote 1, at 408 n.54.
96. Slavney, Experiences with Current Substantative Practicesin Administering Wisconsin Public Employee Relations Statutes: Wisconsin, PuBLic EMPLOYEE
OnGAmZATIoN AND B RGAINmnG 65, 68 (H. Anderson ed. 1968).
97. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 1, at 416.
98. E.g., Rains, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector and the Need
for Exclusion of Supervisory Personnel,23 LAB. L.J. 275 (1972).
99. ACIR, supra note 1, at 95-96.
100. Id.
101. The term
"supervisor" means any individual having
authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. 152 (11) (1970).
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boards have established specific criteria to be followed in determining
whether an employee is a supervisor. 10 2 That so many public employees have
supervisory titles without genuine supervisory responsibilities complicates the
problem. 0 3 There may be special problems with employees who are "seasonal" supervisors during heavy workload months when there is extra help
and regular employees during slack months.10 4
Employees with access to information directly related to labor-management relations are excluded as confidential.1°5 These employees should be
excluded not only from units with other employees, but from any representation in collective negotiations. 0 6 Employees directly involved in personnel
matters may fall into this category. 07 Assistants to elected officials, such as
a deputy clerk, deputy register of deeds, or a deputy treasurer, have been
included in units with other employees against employers' contentions that
they were confidential employees. 0 8 City attorneys not directly involved in
labor relations, and even attorneys directly involved in labor relations with
other city employees but not involving their own organization, have been
allowed bargaining units. 10 9 In Missouri, the Board has excluded confidential
secretaries of managerial employees." 0 Other states have held that such
102. See Slavney, supra note 96, at 68.
103. See Slavney, supra note 1, at E-8. One Missouri city changed the titles
of manual laborers in three-man and four-man departments from "foreman" to
"supervisor" or "superintendent" two months prior to a Board hearing on the
unit issue. In re Employee at City of Cabool 12-16 (Mo. State Board of Mediation,
Jan. 25, 1968).
104. In re Schoolcraft Cty. Rd. Comm'n and Teamsters Local 828, 8 STATE
LAws CCH LAB. L. REP. 49,784 (Mich. Labor Mediation Bd. 1966). The Missouri Board has consistently excluded ad hoe supervisors because they lack sufficient community of interest with the employees they supervise. See, e.g., School
Dist. of Kansas City and Serv. School Employees Local 12 (Mo. State Bd. of
Mediation, Aug. 16, 1971); In re Employees at the State Fed. Soldiers' Home of
Mo. at St. James (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Jan. 4, 1971); In re Employees
of the Div. of Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Oct.
15, 1970). But, in In re Fire Department at City of Grandview (Mo. State Bd. of
Mediation, May 28, 1969), the Board held, in a split decision, that two fire
"captains" who shared meals, sleeping quarters, and housekeeping chores with
eight other firemen, who directed and supervised firefighting in the absence of
the fire chief, and who kept records of fires, were "working foremen" whose
duties were not sufficiently supervisory in amount or kind to justify exclusion
from the unit. Cf. City of Grand Island v. AFSCME, 186 Neb. 711, 185 N.W.2d
860 (1971).
105. Ethyl Corp., 118 NLRB 1869 (1957); Hoover Co., 55 NLRB 1821
(1944). See ACIR, supra note 1, at 95-96.
106. ACIR, supranote 1, at 95.
107. E.g., In re AFSCME Local 188 and Dep't of Personnel of the City of
New York, 8 STATE LAWS CCH LaB. L. REP. 49,994.16, 273 Gov'T EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS REP.B-3 (N.Y.C. Office of Collective Bargaining, Certif. Bd. 1968).
108. E.g., In re Gratiot County Bd. of Supervisors and Mich. Council 55,
AFSCME, 809 Gov'T EMPLOYEE RELATIoNs REP. B-12 (Mich. Labor Mediation
Bd. 1969).
109. E.g., In re Ass'n of Munic. Att'ys of Milwaukee, 8 STATE LAWS CCH
LAa. L. REP. 49, 870 (Wis. Employment Relations Bd. 1967), aff'd sub noma.
City of Milwaukee v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 267 Cov'T EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS REP. B-13 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 48 Wis.2d 596, 168 N.W.2d
809 (1969).
110. In re Employees of the Div. of Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo. State
Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970).
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secretaries should not be excluded where the confidential relationship does
not extend to labor relations matters.'
Security personnel are excluded, if not from representation entirely,
from units with nonsecurity personnel. The justification is that inclusion of
guards in units with nonguards could lead to a conflict of interest with the
guards's duties to protect public property.1 2 Although the Board has
3 it has included "watchmen" in units with
excluded "security employees,""
4
nonsecurity employees."
Miscellaneous groups of employees may be excluded from a particular
unit because they lack sufficient community of interest with the other employees. Part-time, provisional, temporary, and seasonal employees are
usually excluded, in Missouri and elsewhere, from units of regular employees." 5 Persons classified as 6 "trainees" for managerial positions have also
been excluded in Missouri."
C. Size of the Unit
Section 105.500(1) defines an appropriate bargaining unit as "[A] unit
of employees at any plant or installation or in a craft or in a function of a
public body which establishes a clear and identifiable community of interest
among the employees concerned."llr From this language the Board must
determine such things as the types and number of employees to be included,
and the geographical area that the unit should encompass. The statute does
not require that a unit be the most appropriate one, but only that it be an
appropriate one. The problem of determining the size of the unit using the
community of interest criterion is a pervasive one whose resolution depends
largely on the facts and circumstances of each case." 8 The employer frequently seeks the broadest unit possible; the union tends to seek a unit
coinciding with its organizational strength. Some unions, such as the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, seek to organize
broad groups of public employees, while others, like the Teamsters, seek to
organize narrower groups along occupational lines." 9
111. E.g., In re Bd. of Educ. of New Buffalo Area Schools and Dist. 50, UMW,

8 STATE LAws CCH LAB. L. REP. 49,944.05 (Mich. Labor Mediation Bd. 1968).

One case went so far as to include secretaries with direct access to labor relations
information whose duties were removed from the negotiation process. In re Lake
Mich. College, Employer and Secretarial Chap. of Lake Mich. College Fed'n of
Teachers, 3 STATE LAws CCH LAB. L. REP. 49,997.18 (Mich. Employment
Relations Comm'n 1970).
112. Shaw &Clark, supra note 1, at 172.
113. E.g., School Dist. of Kansas City and Serv. School Employees Local 12
(Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Aug. 16, 1971); In re Employees of the Div. of
Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970).
114. In re Employees at the State Fed. Soldiers' Home of Mo. at St. James
(Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Jan. 4, 1971); In re Employees of the Div. of Mental
Health at State Hosps. (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970).
115. E.g., In re Employees of the Div. of Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo.
State Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970).
116. Id.
117. § 105.500(1), RSMo 1969.
118. See Edwards, The Developing LaborRelations Law in the Public Sector,
10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 857, 869 (1972).
119, Gitlow, Public Employee Unionism in the United States: Growth and
Outlook, 21 LAB. L.J. 766, 774 (1970).
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It is universally recognized among states using the community of interest
and similar criteria that attorneys, scientists, engineers, and other employees
in professions requiring specialized knowledge can have their own separate
unit if they desire. 120 Professional employees naturally have considerably
different pay scales and working conditions than nonprofessionals, and,
although there are many professionals in the public sector,' 21 they are frequently a distinct minority among the employees working for a particular
employer. Their interests would be inadequately represented in units with
nonprofessionals. 122 There may, of course, be questions of who is a professional, especially in fields like medicine and teaching where there are
numerous occupational status levels.k'2 There may also be disputes
over the
24
rights of specialists within professions to have their own units.
Skilled craftsmen constitute a second group generally held to have a
right to separate units. 25 Section 105.500(1) authorizes craft units, but what
constitutes a craft? The only Missouri case in point is In re Employees of the
Forestry Department of the City of Kirkwood.126 There the Board held that
four employees in the Forestry Department who performed routine labor
constituted a "craft of specialized workmen" and were therefore an appropriate bargaining unit.127 This determination may indicate a strained defini120. In re Employees at the State Fed. Soldiers' Home of Mo. at St. James

(Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Jan. 4, 1971); In re Employees of the Div. of

Mental Health at State Hosps. (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970). In
neither case is there any indication whether inclusion of the professionals was

requested.
121. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 416.
122. Id. at 409.
123. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 409-10.
124. E.g., In re Highland Park Gen. Hosp. and Mich. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists, 8 STATE LAws CCH LaB. L. REP. M 49,856 (Mich. Labor Mediation
Bd. 1967).
125. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 1967 CCH NLRB
20,981; American
Potash & Chemical Corp., 107 NLBB 1418 (1954); National Tube Co., 76 NLRB
1199 (1948).
126. (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Sept. 25, 1970), af'd sub nom., City of
Kirkwood v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1972).
127. Kirk-wood Hearing, supra note 48, at 42; Mo. State Board of Mediation
Order, Sept. 25, 1970. Local 2 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers sought a Board determination that four manual laborers in the Kirkwood
Forestry Department constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. Kirkwood, a city
of approximately 32,000, had approximately 265 employees, over 100 of which
did manual labor in a wide variety of departments. IBEW Local 2 already represented 18 employees in the Electric Department and the employees of 6 private
contractors who performed functions similar to those performed by employees of
the Forestry Department. No city employees except those in the Electric Department were represented by any labor organization, and the city had previously
rejected an offer by IBEW Local 2 to have an election conducted by the Board
to determine representation of a larger unit of employees in the street, sanitation,
water, and forestry departments. The city had recently carved the Forestry
Department
outofof Forestry
the Street
Department and hired a professional forester as
Superintendent
in an effort to upgrade forestry
work. Forestry work
consisted primarily
of planting, trimming, and removing trees,
clearing brush,
raking leaves, and mowing grass. The Superintendent of Forestry supervised
Forestry Department employees exclusively, and had a separate office. The
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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tion of the term "craft." Yet, the statute does not require a skilled craft, but
merely "a craft or function . . . which establishes a clear and identifiable

community of interest."
Section 105.500(1)

28

129
also authorizes "plant or installation" units.

Although it may seem on first appraisal that employees working at the same
installation should have little difficulty establishing a community of interest,
an installation unit may be inappropriate.8 0 There is also a conflict inherent
in the application of the community of interest criterion to an installation
unit versus a craft unit. An employer may have numerous craftsmen scattered in different departments and installations. Arguably, craftsmen should
be allowed to cut across departmental and installation lines to form craft
units in which their special interests will be represented.1 3 '
The Board's chairman believes, as a general proposition, that the fact
of a common employer is often a sufficient community of interest among
the various city employees. 3 2 Presumably, therefore, one bargaining unit is
appropriate for all, regardless of the difference in their functions. Possible
exceptions to this would be separation of clerical and nonclerical employees 33 and separate representation for certain excluded groups. 134
The drawback of allowing various groups separate units is that it can
lead to such a proliferation of units that it seriously fragments the negotiation process for the employer. This fragmentation leads to at least four probForestry Department had tools, a tool shack, and trucks identified as belonging to
the Forestry Department. However, the tool shack was located in the Street
Department building, and the trucks were kept on the Street Department lot.
Forestry Department tools were used regularly by employees of other departments.
job descriptions, benefits, and wage ranges for Forestry Department and Street
Department employees were identical, and Forestry Department employees were
regularly transferred, on a seasonal basis, to perform functions such as snow

removal and trash pickup under the supervision of the Street Department and the
Sanitation Department.
The court of appeals affirmed the board after the circuit court had reversed
the Board. 478 S.W.2d at 694.
128. § 105.500 (1), RSMo 1969. Thus, clerical employees may be "craftsmen"
within the statute. Where the Board has included clerical employees with laborers
there is no indication that separate units were requested. See, e.g., In re Employees at the State Fed. Soldiers' Home of Mo. at St. James (Mo. State Bd. of
Mediation, Jan. 4, 1971); In re Employees of the Div. of Mental Health at State
Hosps. (Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, Oct. 15, 1970).
129. See statute accompanying note 117 supra.
130. For example, over 9,000 employees at state mental hospitals in Nevada,
Farmington, St. Joseph, Marshall, Higginsville, and St. Louis are in a single unit
represented by the AFSCME. When the Teamsters sought to organze employees
at the state mental hospital in Fulton, the chairman of the board informally
assured the Director of the Division of Mental Health that he had doubts concerning the appropriateness of a Fulton unit and thought it better that the Fulton
employees, ifthey organized, be in the same unit with the other state mental
hospital employees. Interview with Daniel C. Rogers, Chairman of the Mo. State
Bd. of Mediation, in Jefferson City, Mo., Mar. 15, 1973.
131. See In re City of Detroit and Teamsters Local 299, 3 STATE LAws CCH
LAn. L. REP. 49,782 (Mich. Labor Mediation Bd. 1966).
132. Conversation with Daniel C. Rogers, Chairman, Mo. State Board of
Mediation, in Columbia, Mo., March, 1974.
133. See note 128 supra.
184. See part III, § B of this comment.
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lems for the employer. First, competing unions will play leapfrog; when one
has reached an agreement with the employer, another will demand a more
favorable agreement. 8 5 Second, the negotiating sessions required can
become
an administrative burden, causing complications in budget preparation 8 6 and excessive negotiation cost in money and manpower.8 7 Third, it
can make it more difficult for the employer to maintain uniform benefits and
working conditions. 188 Fourth, it invites disputes between units over work
jurisdiction.8 9 Fragmentation has reached' nightmare proportions in some
cities. New York City once had over 200 separate units to deal with, 40 and
Detroit had 146.141
Several solutions to the fragmentation problem have been suggested.
One suggestion is more specific statutory criteria, since statutory ambiguity
has contributed to fragmentation. 142 Recently, states have required the effect
on administrative efficiency and the effects of fragmentation, to be considered in unit determination. 143 Hawaii has limited possible units to 13 types
on an employer-wide basis; neither skilled craftsmen nor workers at different
144
installations are entitled to units separate from other blue-collar workers.
Although some authorities favor this approach because it increases governmental efficiency, 45 others are strongly
opposed because it smothers the
46
special interests of the smaller groups.
A second suggested solution is employer education. The public employer
frequently lacks expertise in labor relations, and this has contributed to
fragmentation. 47 Missouri has taken advantage of federal
assistance to
14
educate public employers in the field of labor relations.
A third suggested solution is coalition negotiating in which representatives of the different units negotiate jointly with the employer. A drawback
to this approach is that larger organizations may smother the interests of
smaller ones.149 Conversely, if smaller units are given a veto they may have
unfair negotiating strength. 50

135. Kilberg, supra note 69, at 24-26.
136. Rock, supranote 1, at 1007.
137. Kilberg, supra note 69, at 24.
138. Shaw & Clark, supranote 1, at 152.
189. Zagoria, Municipal Labor Relations, 86 Mo. MUN. REv. 6, 7 (April 1971).
140. Rock, supra note 1, at 1003.
141. Zagoria, supranote 139, at 7.
142. Shaw & Clark, supra note 1, at 155.
143. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(e) (1), (5) (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT.
ANN.tit. 43, § 1101.604(1) (ii),
(4)(Supp.1973).
144. See HA wvA REv. STAT. § 89-6 (Supp. 1973).
145. E.g., Edwards, supranote 118, at 869.
146. E.g., Sullivan, supra note 1, at 402, 416.
147. Zagoria, supra note 139, at 7.
148. Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, Special Missouri Municipal
League Staff Report, 86 Mo. MUN. REv.8 (Oct. 1971).
149. Rock, supra note 1, at 1014-15. A potential solution for the analogous
problem of nearby employers being whipsawed by competing unions is coalition
negotiating, in which employers negotiate jointly through an employer association

and the results are reduced to a master plan. ACIR, supra note 1, at 109-10;
Smythe, supra note 1, at 50-51.
150. Rock, supra note 1, at 1014-15.
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IV. PAO osED LEGiSLATION
There has been a rash of bills and resolutions in the Missouri legislature
recently relating to public sector labor relations.' 51 With respect to bargaining units, two things stand out. First, many of these bills have included
teachers, an occupational group that presents complex unit determination
issues.'1 2 Second, at least one bill has seemingly restricted the definition
of "supervisor."5 3
Federal legislation to place various aspects of state and local employee
labor relations under federal jurisdiction has also been proposed. 154 The
simplest and most drastic 55 would put state and local employee labor relations under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board along
with private sector labor relations by striking the words "or any state or
political subdivision thereof"' 56 from the National Labor Relations Act.lmr
Thus, bargaining unit determination at the state and local level would be
according to the comparatively well established criteria applied in the
private sector. Placing state and local governments under the National Labor
Relations Act would probably be constitutional, 158 but it is undesirable
because labor-management structures in the public sector vary greatly from
those in the private sector, and public sector structures vary greatly from
state to state' 5 9
151. E.g., S.B. 190, 77th Mo. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1978); S.B. 233, 77th Mo.
Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1978); H.B. 1324, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1972);
H.B. 1250, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1972); H.B. 865, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass.,
1st Sess. (1971); H.B. 587, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1971); H.B. 474, 76th
Mo. Gen Ass., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J.R. 28, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1972);
H.J.R. 88, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1972); H.J.R. 87, 76th Mo. Gen. Ass.,
1st Sess. (1971).
152. See M. MosKow, TEACHERs AND UNIONs 189-69 (1968); Doherty,

Determination of Bargaining Units and Election Procedures in Public School
Teacher RepresentationElections, 19 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 573 (1966).
153. S.B. 190, 77th Mo. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973), contained the following
definition of "supervisor":
[Any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
perform the preponderance of the following acts of authority: To hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or
discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them and to adjust
their grievances, if, in connection with the fore oing, the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment ....
Id. § 1 (5). Even some city managers may not, in the technical sense, have the
"authority" to do the preponderance of the enumerated acts. See § 77.046, RSMo
1969; 27 Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri No. 479, at 5, Dec. 10, 1970.
154. E.g., H.R. 12532, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 9324, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1971); H.R. 7684, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
155. H.R. 12582, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
158, See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
159. See Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 811-13 (1970). The variance among states is
also an argument against blanket adoption of one of the many proposed state
model acts, e.g., AFSCME MODEL STATE COLLECTIVE BAnCGuANG LAW FOR
PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS, REF. FILE GOVT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REP. 51:25155 (1973).
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